interior allocation is strictly preferred to a boundary allocation.3 Briefly, the mechanism proceeds as follows: The reported messages are used to determine the personal price paid by each consumer of a public good, and these prices are summed to determine the amount received by the producer for each unit of that public good supplied. Next, find the profit maximizing level of output for the public goods subject to global material constraint. Although the profit maximizing vector may not be consistent with individual budget balance, an adjustment is then made so that the individual budget constraint is satisfied for every consumer, even out of equilibrium; by selecting the public goods vector that is closest to the profit maximizing one. We will have profit maximization at equilibrium.4 The outcome for the private good is then determined such that the budget constraint of each agent holds with equality. This mechanism has all the desirable properties mentioned above. Further, under conditions imposed in the paper, we show that the set of Nash allocations coincides with the set of Lindahl allocations.
It is important to have a mechanism which implements the Lindahl correspondence for the following reasons. First, Lindahl allocations result in Pareto efficient allocations. Much of the literature on the design and evaluation of allocation mechanisms has adopted the Pareto-efficiency correspondence as an ideal for performance comparisons. Economists desire Pareto efficiency as a basic social goal partly because of the known and satisfactory efficiency properties of competitive markets and partly because of the acceptability of the concept of Paretoefficiency as a minimal welfare criteria. Second, it results in individually rational allocations in the usual sense that they are not worse than the initial endowment.
Third, the concept of Lindahl equilibrium is very similar to the conventional concept of Walrasian equilibrium with attention to the well-known duality which reverses the role of prices and quantities between private and public goods, and between Walrasian and Lindahl allocations. In the Walrasian case, prices must be equalized while quantities are individualized; in the Lindahl case the quantities of the public good must be the same for everyone, while prices charged for the public good are individualized. In addition, the concepts of Walrasian and Lindahl equilibria are both relevant to private-ownership economies.
Including DRS technology in a Lindahl correspondence is interesting for two reasons. First, DRS technology is more common than CRS for producing a public good. The causes of DRS in the production of public goods are largely the same as for private goods. For example, consider the production of uranium for nuclear weapons that are used for national defense, it may be difficult or impossible to double all inputs, in that increasing the scale of operation would necessarily force the miners to operate on less rich veins of rock. DRS could also arise if some inputs IMPLEMENTATION OF LINDAHL ALLOCATIONS 39 were inadvertently omitted in estimating a production function. Decreasing returns to scale are also likely to be the case when the scale of operation is very large.
Upward sloping average and marginal cost curves may be present at high output levels because coordination and control become increasingly difficult. Information may be lost or distorted as it is transmitted from workers to lower-level management and then to top level management, and the reverse may be equally likely.
Channels of communication become more complex and more difficult to monitor, additional monitoring services cannot generally be obtained as readily as can additional inputs. Decisions require more time to make and implement. Second, our mechanism for DRS technologies is drastically different from mechanisms for CRS technologies. In the CRS case, the personalized prices of all agents in the existing mechanisms are independent of their own messages. In our mechanism however, the personalized prices of agents with nonzero profit shares depend on their own messages while only the personalized prices of agents without profit shares are independent of their own messages. We prove in Theorems 3 and 4 that this is a generic property for any balanced and smooth mechanism which implements the Lindahl correspondence. It seems to us that this is an important distinction between CRS and DRS technologies when designing a balanced mechanism which implements the Lindahl correspondence. As an application of Theorems 3 and 4, one can conclude that the mechanisms proposed by Walker (1981) and Tian (1990 Tian ( , 1991 which implement the Lindahl correspondence for CRS technologies cannot be modified easily to implement the Lindahl correspondence for public goods economies with DRS technologies, because in those mechanisms the personalized prices of all agents are independent of their own messages.
Our mechanism also improves the results of Walker (1981) and Nakamura (1989) in several aspects. Walker (1981) considered a general production technology, but his mechanism has several undesirable properties for economies with more than one private good.5 Specifically, his mechanism is a combination of a game form and the market mechanism, so it is not really a "pure"game form but a quasi-game form in the sense that it requires that producers are nonplayer participants6; it is not individually feasible, balanced, or single valued. Nakamura (1989) constructed two "pure" mechanisms which implement the Lindahl correspondence. However, one of them is neither (weakly) balanced nor individually feasible. The other is balanced but still not individually feasible and uses the strong assumption that all agents share the profits. For the importance of designing individually feasible, balanced, single-valued, and continuous mechanisms, see Groves and Ledyard (1987, pp. 72-75) and Tian (1989 Tian ( , 1991 .
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets forth a public goods economy model and presents a "pure" mechanism which has the desirable properties mentioned above. Section 3 shows that this mechanism fully implements the Lindahl correspondence. Section 4 proves that, for any balanced and smooth "pure" mechanism implementing the Lindahl correspondence, the personalized prices of consumers with nonzero profit shares must depend on their own messages and the personalized prices of those consumers without profit shares must be independent of their own messages. Finally, in Section 5, we give some concluding remarks.
2. PUBLIC GOODS MODEL AND MECHANISM 2.1. Economic Environments. We consider public goods economies with n agents who consume one private good x (the numeraire) and K public goods y.
Throughout this paper subscripts are used to index agents and superscripts are used to index goods unless otherwise stated. Denote by N = {1, 2, ... , n} the set of agents. Each agent's characteristic is denoted by ei = (wi, Ri), where wi is the initial endowment of the private good and Ri the preference ordering (Pi denotes the asymmetric part of the preference R ) defined on R +I+K. We assume that there are no initial endowments of public goods, but that public goods can be produced from the private good. We further assume that there is only one producer7 whose production technology is given by a cost function C: RK -> R+, and each consumer i has a nonnegative profit share Oi with LEN Oi = 1. An economy is the full vector e = (e 1, ... , e n, C) and the set of all such economies is denoted by E.
The following additional assumptions are made on E. 2.2. Lindahl Allocations. An allocation (x, y) = (x1, ... , xn, y) is feasible for an economy e if (x, y) E Rn++K and >ij xi + C(y) c E in I wi. An allocation (x, y) is Pareto efficient for an economy e if it is feasible and there does not exist another feasible allocation (x', y') such that ui(xt, y') ' ui(xi, y) for all i E N and uj(x), y') > uj(xj, y) for somej E N.10 An allocation (x, y) is individually rational for an economy e if ui(xi, y) ' ui(wi, 0) for all i E N.
An allocation (x*, y*) is a Lindahl allocation for an economy e if it is feasible and there are personalized price vectors q* E R K , one for each i, such that 1) xs + q -y* Y*' wi + Oi(q* * y* -C(y*)) for all i E N; 2) ui(xi, y) > uj(x*, y*) implies xi + q* * y > wi + Oi(q*. y* -C(y*)) for all i E N;
3) q* . y* -C(y*) = maxyR+K(q* * y -C(y)), where Xi7 l1 q* -q*. Denote by L(e) the set of all such allocations. Let A = {y E R +K: 0 < C( y) -w} be the feasible production set under given resources w = i-in I wi . Then A is nonempty, compact, and convex (by noting that C(y) is convex).
The profit maximizing level of output for public goods is given by PROOF. We want to find a message m* such that (x*, y*) is a Nash allocation.
We first assume that at least two agents have nonzero profit shares (i.e., Oi E [0, 1) for all i E N, which belongs to Case (i)). Consider the following linear equations only one agent receives all the profit, the linear equations system is specified by (5) to (7) and thus clearly has a unique solution. Then, for both cases, we can find a unique m* such that qi(m*) = q*, q(m*) = 2i qi(m*) = 1= qi, q(m*) = DC(Y(m*)), Xi(m*) = x4, Y(m*) = y* From (18) and (21), we know that the first order condition for Lindahl allocations is the same as the first order condition for Nash allocations. So we need only show that the first order necessary condition for Nash equilibrium is actually sufficient for Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) we know that Nash implementation is always at least as costly, in message space size, as (decentralized) realization. Because the minimal dimension required for decentralized realization of the Lindahl correspondence under prescribed behavior is nK (compare Sato 1981 or Hurwicz 1986b , the mechanism presented in this paper has a message space of minimal dimension and thus is informationally efficient. Also, because every Lindahl allocation is Pareto efficient and individually rational, the mechanism yields Pareto efficient and individually rational allocations.
Summarizing the above discussions, we conclude that for public goods economies E satisfying Assumptions 1 to 5, there exists a completely feasible, continuous, and almost everywhere differentiable mechanism with a message space of minimal dimension which fully Nash-implements the Lindahl correspondence.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MECHANISMS FOR DRS
Notice that the above mechanism is drastically different from the usual CRS mechanisms. Groves and Ledyard (1987, p. 77) argued that, for a given mechanism in public goods economies with CRS, if the joint message m * is a Nash equilibrium that yields a Lindahl allocation, the personalized prices qi(m*) may depend on the messages of other agents, but not on the agent's own message. In our mechanism dealing with DRS, the personalized prices of consumers with nonzero profit shares depend on their own messages while only the personalized prices of consumers with zero profit shares are independent of their own messages. One may wonder if this distinction is valid for any balanced and smooth mechanism which fully implements the Lindahl correspondence. The following results answer this question. REMARK 7. Since in the case of CRS, every agent's profit share can be considered as zero, the above theorem actually supports the arguments for the CRS technology made by Groves and Ledyard (1987) .
REMARK 8. As an application of Theorems 3 and 4, consider the mechanisms proposed by Walker (1981) and Tian (1990) for one private and one public good economies. These mechanisms are differentiable around Nash equilibria, satisfy the budget constraints with equality, and yield personalized prices of agents independent of their own messages. Although they implement the Lindahl correspondence for CRS technologies, we know by Theorems 3 and 4, that simple modifications of these mechanisms cannot implement the Lindahl correspondence under DRS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the above sections we have given a simple mechanism which is well-behaved in the sense that the mechanism is individually feasible, balanced, continuous, and has a message space of minimal dimension. Moreover, the mechanism is almost everywhere differentiable on the message space and differentiable on some neighborhood of every Nash equilibrium so that we can use the differential approach. We have also shown that mechanisms for DRS are drastically different from the mechanisms for CRS in a way that some agents' personalized prices must depend on their own messages if the mechanisms are balanced and smooth. In this section, we would like to mention some possible extensions.
First, the mechanism presented here deals only with public goods economies and Li (1991) , the mechanism presented above can be generalized to include economies with an arbitrary number of private goods and a DRS technology by combining the above mechanism and a mechanism given in Tian (1992) . The resulting mechanism would be completely feasible, continuous, and implement the Lindahl correspondence.
Second, the mechanism obtained in this paper works only for public goods economies that have strictly decreasing returns to scale. However, this restriction can be relaxed easily to include economies with general convex production possibility sets (including CRS and DRS technologies) by combining the above mechanism and the mechanism given in Tian (1991) . Such techniques have been used in Tian and Li (1995) . The resulting mechanism will have all the desirable properties of the above mechanism.
Third, similar to those mechanisms proposed by Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1984) , and Tian (1993) , the mechanism presented above can be .extended to allow for endowments unknown to the designer. This case of course certainly increases the size of the message space but reduces the information requirements on the designer.
Finally, like many mechanisms in the literature (such as those in Hurwicz 1979 , Walker 1981 , Tian 1990 ), we have assumed that the technology is known to the designer in the above mechanism. This is clearly not a satisfactory assumption.
